Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1985

New Mexico v. Earnest
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
New Mexico v. Earnest. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 129. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

!J

~

4

~ a '' • ''

~2...,1-~l-4

1

""

,~~

,,

t-l

~q~~~
Preliminary Memo

~

S" ~

~~
LA- A.,---;;;;r~4-< ~ ~ ~ - L1 ~
'
.

September 30, 1985 Conference ,
~ ~ ~~
summer List 15, Sheet 4 ~ ~-4-c-.~~
No.

~ ~u-~~~~y_,~

~5-162-CSY

. NEW MEXICO

~

V~ ....:,/)..,_.

1

A

Cert to N.M. S.Ct.
y osa, Walters)

(Riordan,

-~v~(fi"3)~k ~

v.

EARNEST (gran ted new trial)

State /Criminal

Timely

~~LA-~ ~I-ii_

1.

~ZJ/A..~~~~~
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SUMMARY:

holding that

Petr contends that the N.M. s.ct. erred in

the ~r*nta~~ause

-

precluded admission into

evidence of the hearsay inculpatory confession of a co-defendant
without first considering the statement's indicia of reliability.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

On February 12, 1982, the

body of one Eastman was discovered next to a rural highway in New

I

Mexico.

"'--

twice in the head.

Eastman's throat had been cut, and he had been shot
A few hours later, resp and his co-defendants

l.~

·

- .:.. -

'l

Boeglin and Conner were arrested driving Eastman's

ce~;r.

Following the arrest, Boeglin made a statement to the '.
authoritie s .

Eastman's throat.
bft.J~ ts

---------====

In this statement, he confessed that he had cut
He also stated that resp had fired one of th e

which struck Eastman.

Resp, Boeglin, and Conner were each tried separately.

Resp

was charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping,
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance
(methamphetamines), and possession of a controlled substance
(same).

Resp's first trial ended in a mistrial.

Prior to the

second trial, petr and resp argued the admissibility of Boeglin's
statement, petr arguing that it was admissible because it was a
statement against Boeglin's penal interest and thus an exception
to the hearsay rule under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.

The

trial court noted that the statement was self-incriminating and
that it was corroborated by evidence given at the first trial but
reserved ruling on the question.
At the second trial, petr called Boeglin to the stand, but
he refused to answer questions, citing his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.

At petr's request, the

trial court granted use immunity to Boeglin, but Boeglin
continued to refuse to testify.

Even after the trial court

explained to Boeglin that he could not claim his Fifth Amendment
right in the face of use immunity, Boeglin continued to refuse to
testify.
(

He was cited for contempt and excused.

At that point,

petr moved to have Boeglin declared unavailable, which motion was
granted.

~he

tape and transcript of Boeglin's confession were

-3I.

~
then allowed into evidence, and resp was convicted o,n all counts

--

and sentenced to life in pr i §.P, n.
Resp then appealed to the N.M. s.ct., claiming in part that
the admission of Boeglin's confession unconstitutionally violated
his right to confront witnesses against him.

The N.M. s.ct.

noted that Boeglin was clearly unavailable to testify.
relying on Douglas v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 415

Then,

(1965), the court

held that admission of the confession was unconstitutional.
Specifically, the court noted that the facts in vr(c uglas were
essentially identical to the facts here: An accomplice, who was
called as a state's witness and refused to testify on Fifth
Amendment grounds, had previously confessed to the crime and had
implicated Douglas in the confession.

Given this Court's Douglas

I

holding that the confession should not have been allowed, the
N.M. s.ct. disallowed Boeglin's confession here.
The N.M. S.Ct. distinguished Ohio v. Roberts,

448 U.S. 56

(1980), as allowing a prior statement only when there had
previously been an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

(In

Roberts, the witness had testified at the preliminary hearing.)
Although the court noted the general test indicated in Roberts
for constitutionality under the Confrontation Clause (if a
statement falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, it
may be presumed to be adequately reliable to be constitutionally
admitted), it distinguished Roberts on its facts.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr first argues that the Court should

grant cert in this case because the opinion below illustrates
significant recurring problems about the relationship between the

-':t-

hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.

Specific~lly,

petr

contends that the opinion of the court below, which con::luded
that Roberts was restricted to situations in which the
opportunity to cross-examine had been present extrajudicially,
read Roberts too narrowly.

Petr also notes that other cases

purporting to apply Roberts have not relied simply on the
presence of a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception but have gone on
to consider indicia of reliability as well.

Finally, petr

contends that the N.M. s.ct. 's reliance on Douglas in this case
illustrates a seeming inconsistency between early Confrontation
Clause cases such as Douglas, where the emphasis was on the
ability to cross-examine, and later cases such as Roberts, where
the emphasis is on reliability factors represented by established
hearsay exceptions and not exclusively on the availability of
cross-examination.
Secooo, petr argues that the opinion below conflicts with
decisions by other federal and state appellate courts.

Those

courts, contends petr, have allowed admission of statements that
were not subject to cross-examination when those statements were
de te rmi ned to have adequate indicia of reliability.

In this

context, petr cites u.s. v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769 (CA2),
cert. denied, 104 s.ct. 704

(1984): u.s. v. Lisotto, 722 F.2d 85

(CA4), cert. denied, 104 s.ct. 1682 (1984): State v. Parris, 654
F.2d 77 (Wash. 1982).

In these cases, asserts petr, such

statements were examined for reliability by the reviewing courts
(

(contrary to the court's action below), and admission was
allowed.

-!::>-

(

Third, petr asserts sii'!PlY that the decision belpw is wrong,
that it is inconsistent with the recent decisions of this Court,
and that it would prevent the admission of obviously reliable
evidence.
Resp contends that in fact there is no tension
Douglas and this Court's later

bet~en

Resp notes that,

decision~.

despite the Roberts language relied on by petr, this Court has
never held that a statement by a non-testifying accomplice or codefendant in custodial interrogation is admissible where that
witness has not previously been subject to cross-examination.
Further, resp argues that the fact that a statement falls
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule does not
conclusively prove that it is reliable.

In fact,

resp notes that

the courts that have allowed such statements have made
independent determinations of the indicia of reliability.

And,

resp ootes, one of the factors courts have considered in factual
situations similar to this case is whether an accomplice may be
trying to curry favor with the authorities by inculpating a third
party.

See, e.g., Katsougrakis, supra, 715 F.2d at 775.

This

factor, notes resp, has been viewed with suspicion by other
courts arrl is clearly present in this case.

As a general rule,

resp argues, statements made by a non-testifying accomplice or
co-defendant while in custody simply do not bear the indicia of
reliability necessary to bring them within the Roberts
formulation.
f

Thus, the Court's Douglas decision has rot

effectively been undermined by intervening decisions.

•'

-o-

Finally, resp argues that the N.M. s.ct. 's reliapce on
Douglas was correct in this situation.

Resp notes that here

Boeglin was not under oath when the statement was made, was never
subjected to cross -ex ami nat ion, had adm i t ted to the use of
methamphetamines prior to being interrogated, minimized in his
statement his own participation in the crime (and actually denied
it completely in other statements), and never indicated precisely
who the other persons incriminated in his statement were.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There does appear to be some confusion

among the lower courts as to how broadly Roberts should be read.
Most courts have declined to go so far as petr would suggest and
have, when allowing a statement in to evidence bee au se it is based
on a firmly rooted hearsay exception, gone on to consider its

(

specific indicia of reliability as well.

V

On the other hand, the

N.M. s.ct. 's interpretation of Roberts as allowing a statement in
only w

been available for cross-

examination seems narrower than the general interpretation
(although not actually inconsistent with the holdings of this
Court 's c ase s) .
This case does, however, seem to be factually

---------

indistinguishable fran Douglas.

z:.

Here the statement sought to be

introouced was a confession of an accomplice that was
made during
.....__.__..the accomplice and
~'-~'-~----~------~
the defendant, and the reason that the accomplice was unavailable

---

was that he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.

(

In addition,

the Court did not explicitly overrule Douglas in Roberts, so it
would appear to sti 11 be gooo law.

Further, none of the lower

courts that have addressed this factual situation since Roberts
I

have come to a different cooclusion.

See, e.g., Olsori v. Green,

668 F.2d 421 (CA8), cert. denied, 102 s.ct. 2303 (1982)

----------

result as Douglas and N.M. s.ct. ~ w).

In fact,

(same

i ~:_: veral
·-·-

of

··- ~

the cases cited by petr the courts have noted that this
s tody,

situation, with a statement

-

is particularly fraught with the potential

iability.

Finally, the factors mentioned by resp do indicate that the case
for

inferring reliability from the external circt.nnstances of this

case is less than compelling.
Thus, although this is an area that the Court might want at
some point to clarify and the N.M. s.ct. did seem to read Roberts
more narrowly than other courts have in other factual contexts,

(

the particular facts of this case and the N.M. s.ct. 's reliance
on Douglas as controlling make this a
I

5.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

March 29, 1986

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Bill

Re:

New Mexico v. Earnest, No. 85-162
Cert to New Mexico Supreme Court
Argument date:

April 1, 1986 (Tuesday)
'-

Question Presented
Does the Confrontation Clause require exclusion of an uncross-examined
police

statement by an accomplice,

interrogation,

where

the

made

statement

in response to
implicates

defendant and where the accomplice is unavailable to testify?

Statement of Facts

the

2.

This

case

arises

out

of

dru~-related

a

~urder.

The

victim's body was found on a roadside on February 12, 1982.

The

victim had been shot twice in the head and his throat was cut.
Police determined that the knife wound had not been deep enough
to kill the victim, but that the victim had died from the gunshot
wounds

instead.

The

same day

that

the

body was found,

police

found respondent, Boeglin, and Connor driving the victim's truck;
the three men were arrested for murder.
Boeglin

was

then

by

interrogated

police.

Boeglin

suggested that he wanted to make some kind of deal with police,
because

he

feared

interrogator
prosecutor

made

if

what
no

might

happen

promises,

Boeglin

told

save

to

him

that

in

he

prison.

would

His

tell

the

Boegl in then confessed,

the truth.

explaining that the three men had killed the victim because they
thought

he

was

a

government

Boeglin

agent.

personally had cut the victim's throat,
dull

and

had

not

cut

very

that

he

but that the knife was

Boeglin

deeply.

stated

also

stated

that

respondent was the one who shot the victim in the head.
The
When

three

respondent

defendants
was

tried,

Boeglin's confession.
immunity,
surrounding

but

he

were
the

tried

separately

government

sought

for
to

murder.

introduce

Boeglin was put on the stand and given use

still

the murder,

refused

making

it

to

testify

to

impossible for

the

events

respondent to

~

cross-examine

him.

On

respondent's

motion,

the

TC

granted

a

.Jo

mistrial.l

then retried. , Boeglin ~gain refused

Respondent was
This

to~.

time,

dir~tly,

into e_yidence

and the TC admitted it.

Respondent was

convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed.
Douglas v. Alabama, 380

u.s.

The court found

415 (1965) controlling.

In Douglas,

as here, a codefendant confessed and implicated the defendant; in
Douglas

this

Court

held

of

the

codefendant's confession violated the Confrontation Clause.

The

court next addressed the argument that Ohio v. Roberts, 448

u.s.

that

introduction

the

v

56

(1980)

altered

preliminary

.--------

hearing

examination.

In

cross-examined.
admission of

Douglas.

Roberts,

testimony

this case,

that

the court noted,
was

subject

to

involved
cross-

the out-of-court statement was un-

The court concluded that Roberts foreclosed the

~hearsay

cross-examination.

as to which there was no opportunity for

This Court granted cert.

Discussion

lwhen Boeglin was put on the stand and given use
immunity, the TC told him that he would cit~ for
c~l
contempt
if
he did not
testify.
Boeglin
nevertheless refused to answer 26 separate questions; the
TC imposed a one-year sentence for contempt for each
failure to answer. Respondent moved for a mistrial on the
ground that Boeglin was being coerced.
When it became
clear
that
Boeglin
was
not
going
to
testify
notwithstanding the TC's threats, respondent sought to
withdraw his motion for a mistrial.
The TC granted a
mistrial anyway.
The decision to grant a mistrial was
affirmed by the New Mexico Supreme Court; respondent
separately petitioned for cert to review that decision.
The cert petition, No. 84-6791, is pending (held for this
case).- - - - -

4.

1.

At

the

outset,

I

note

that

Court's opinion plainly misdescr ibes

than

construction

those

of

prior

involving

unconstitutional.

Roberts,

New ME;xico

Roberts.

~

court's

't he

all

hearsay

recorded

As United States v.

Under

Supreme

the

state

exceptions

other

testimony

would

be

Inadi, 84-1580 (March 10,

1986) shows, that is obviously not the law.
But although some of the court's discussion is just wrong,
on the narrow issue, for the reasons that follow, I think the New
Mexico Supreme Court reached the correct result.

2.

u.s.

In Douglas v. Alabama, 380

415 (1965), the Court

created what appeared to be a per se rule barring introduction of
one defendant's confession against another defendant.
v.

United States,

391

u.s.

123

(1968),

In Bruton

the Court extended that

rule, and found that where the codefendants were tried together,
one defendant's confession could never be introduced at all--even
with

a

limiting

instruction--because of

the potential that the

jury would apply it against the non-confessing defendant.

v

~

Unless they have been modified, Douglas and Bruton govern
this

The

case.

that

Douglas

developments;
448

u.s.

state makes

and

Bruton

two arguments

have

been

for

the proposition

narrowed

both arguments rest on dicta

by

subsequent

in Ohio v.

Roberts,

56 (1980).

According to the state, Roberts stated a general rule that
hearsay is admissible under the confrontation clause if
declarant
See 448

...

is

unavailable,

u.s.,

at 65-66 •

and

( 2)

the declaration

In this case,

there

(1)

the

is reliable.

is no doubt that

::>.

Boeglin was unavailable to testify--he was given use. immunity and
still refused to testify about the events surrounding the murder.
Thus,

the

state argues,

admissible

if

it

was

under Roberts Boegl in's confession was
sufficiently

reliable.

Roberts

further

stated that "[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case
where

the

evidence

exception."

448

u.s.,

falls

within

at 66.

a

firmly

rooted

hearsay

The state contends that Boeglin's

confession was a statement against penal interest, and therefore
falls

within

Boeglin' s

a

"firmly

confess ion has

rooted
strong

Alternatively,

exception."

indicia of

reliability because

pieces of it are corroborated by other evidence in the case.

3.

In evaluating these arguments,

the first question is

whether Roberts affected Douglas and Bruton at all.

In light of

~your opinion in United States v. Inadi, 84-1580 (March 10, 1986),
you might think the answer is no.

Inadi emphasized that Roberts

has to be read in light of its own facts--that Justice Blackmun's
opinion in that case did not constitute any major rewriting of
Confrontation Clause precedent.

Slip op. at 5-6.

Thus,

in this

case, one might logically argue that Roberts is irrelevant on its
facts

(Roberts

involved

preliminary

hearing

testimony,

not

a

codefendant confession), and proceed to consider whether Douglas
and Bruton still make sense.
Unfortunately
approach

appears

(argued Dec.
not yet

.. ,

(at

least

foreclosed.

In

in

v

my

Lee

view) ,
v.

that

Illinois,

reasonable
No.

84-6807

9, 1985), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court--

announced--explicitly concludes

that

if

the

state

can

b.

show that a codefendant confession is especially reliable, it can
be admitted against a non-confessing defendant.
at 12-13. 2
clerks,

4th Draft

As I understand the situation from Justice Brennan's

the

O'Connor's

relevant

insistence;

discussion
it

is

state's

threshold

was

thus

removed in any subsequent editing.
the

Lee,

argument

inserted

unlikely

at

that

it

Justice
will

be

Thus, under Lee,

in

this case

is

a

winner,

and

courts must consider whether a codefendant confession either fits
within

a

"deeply

rooted

hearsay

exception,"

or

has

special

indicia of reliability.

4.

Boeglin's confession in this case does not fall within

any deeply rooted hearsay exception.
declaration against penal interest.

The state contends it is a
That's obviously correct, as

to those parts of the confession that implicate Boeglin himself.

Boeglin's penal interest.

On the contrary, Boeglin has a strong

interest in so testifying:

the stab wounds that Boeglin admits

inflicting did not kill the victim; rather, the gunshot wounds to
the head were the cause of death.

By claiming that respondent

was the triggerman,

Boegl in may have sought to protect himself

against

penalty.

sought

the

death

to gain police

identifying

another

favor

killer

Alternatively,
(and a more
more

culpable

Boeglin

may

have

favorable bargain)
than

himself.

by
Both

2 Justices Marshall, Stevene
sn
9
d O'Connor have joined
Justice Brennan's opinion in ee. You are in dissent.
-~

I •

potential motives belie the contention that Boeglinl.,s implication
of respondent was somehow against Boeglin's penal interest.

5.

Thus,

the question is whether there are some special

indicia of reliability that require this statement to be admitted
-------------~

notwithstanding the

"presumption of unreliability that attaches

to codefendants' confessions."
(not

yet

announced) .

paragraph,

I

incentive

to

triggerman.

think

For

the

Lee v.
the

answer

implicate

Illinois, 4th draft at 12

reasons

is

someone

no.

stated

Boegl in

other

than

had

the
a

last

definite

himself

as

the

That alone makes it seem unfair to use Boeglin's un-

cross-examined confession against respondent.
counter

in

this

argument

by

pointing

to

The state tries to

details

of

Boeglin's

(.~.~.~~>

statement that are corroborated by other evidence.

There 1s no

need to discuss that argument in any detail, because the central
feature

of

Boeglin's

ment

(at

least

for

purposes

of

respondent's trial)--the identification of respondent as the man
who

shot

the

corroborated.

victim
Absent

in

the

head--is

Boeglin's statement,

not
there

independently
appears

to be

nothing on which to base a conclusion that respondent rather than
Boeglin shot the victim.
Boeglin' s

For this reason, I would conclude that

statement has no

special

indicia of reliability,

and

that the New Mexico Supreme Court correctly reversed respondent's
conviction on this ground.

Conclusion

..

u.

I

I

would affirm.

thoroughly

faulty

Douglas v.

Alabama,

was

improperly

The New Mexico Supreme Court applied a

analysis,

but

its

judgment was correct under

as modified by Ohio v. Roberts.

convicted

based

in

part

on

a

Respondent

codefendant's

~~--------------~

confession,

and

there are no special circumstances that render

the codefendant confession especially trustworthy.
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Dear Bill:

~

~

Do we really need anything more than the last
sentence of your proposed per curiam, sans the word
"therefore"? I think that is the usual form GVR's
take, is it not?

f

~~
,
·
Al[fl~

LX/
~

As for the per curiam, my worry is that it may
be taken as an obtri9~eversal, rather than as an
v
,instruction to t e sta e court to review its decision ~
in light of Lee. It seems to me that the cites to
~}Roberts, Ina~ and other cases will simply reinforce L/[ ·
the impression that this is a reversal, which of
course it is not.
~
In short, would not the usual form of GVR
disposition suffice? I feel strongly on this one.

~
~

- - - - - - - - - ? &- !/ ~

Sincerely,

t.)Jf'J,l..

}-rL

;;,

Justice Rehnquist
To the Conference
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CHAM15ERS Of'
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w ...

..J . BRENNAN, ..JR.

April 17, 1986

New Mexico v. Earnest
85-162
Dear Bill:
Do we really need anything more than the last
sentence of your proposed per curiam, sans the word
"therefore"? I think that is the usual form GVR's
take, is it not?
As for the per curiam, my worry is that it may
be taken as an outright reversal, rather than as an
instruction to the state court to review its decision
in light of Lee. It seems to me that the cites to
Roberts, Ina~ and other cases will simply reinforce
the impression that this is a reversal, which of
course it is not.
In short, would not the usual form of GVR
disposition suffice? I feel strongly on this one.
Sincerely,

IJ 7 f'J , 7.. } ·TL
Justice Rehnquist
To the Conference

t!t '•

Qfttttrl 4tf tltt ~tb ,StaUs
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 18, 1986

Re:

No. 85-162

New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill,
It would have been quite reasonable to simply "hold"
this case for Lee v. Illinois, in which case the simple
"grant, vacate:-and remand" for that case suggested in your
letter of April 17th would have been the logical result.
But instead we granted the case and heard oral argument in
it, and I therefore think it is worth the effort to get
something more out of the time we have put 1nto it than the
disposition which you propose.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico expressed the view in
its opinion in this case that hearsay evidence violated the
Confrontation Clause unless there had been a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in some sort of a
judicial proceeding. It found support for this view in two
cases from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, cited
in my circulating draft in the present case. I understood
from the Conference discussion that a majority thought this
view was incorrect, and I think it is appropriate to say so
in an opinion dealing with the present case. One could say
that implicitly your circulating opinion in Lee v. Ilinois
reaches the same conclusion, but it does not say so in so
many words.
I think a simple grant, vacate, and remand to
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the light of Lee would be
considerably less clear in pointing out to that court its
mistake than the proposed Per Curiam which I have
circulated.
--Sincerely~

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

;+ 's

.ju;n-tmt Qlonrt of tltt ~b ~ta.tt·
. .ZUtlfinght~ ~. <q. 2ll~,.~
CHAMB!:RS Of"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

April 21, 1986

RE:

85-162 - New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill:·
I join the April 17 draft of your per curiam.
Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Elackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

REVISIONS THROU~H

p

A

From:

Justice Rehnquist

/ .( ~ ~ ~:::::d:_AP_R_2_3_198_6_
2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-162

NEW MEXICO, PETITIONER v. RALPH
RODNEY EARNEST
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW MEXICO
[April - , 1986]
PER CURIAM.

Respondent Earnest was tried, found guilty by a jury, and
sentenced on charges of murder and other offenses in a New
Mexico trial court. On appeal the Supreme Court of New
Mexico reversed his conviction because of its view that the
admission against him of an out-of-court statement of a codefendant violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
N. M. - , 703 P. 2d 872 (1985).
The statement in question was a taped declaration by one
Phillip Boeglin who, along with respondent and one Perry
Connor, was charged with the crimes in question. The State
called Boeglin to testify against respondent, but he refused,
asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court
granted Boeglin use immunity, but he persisted in his refusal
to testify. Boeglin was held in contempt and excused from
the witness stand. The State then offered the taped declaration Boeglin made to police officers shortly after his arrest.
Since Boeglin never testified at respondent's trial, nor in any
prior proceeding, respondent had no opportunity to crossexamine him about his prior declaration.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that under our decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), unless there
has been an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in an

·..
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earlier judicial proceeding, the admission of an out-of-court
declaration from a witness such as Boeglin violates a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. In so holding the
supreme court relied upon two cases from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Allen, 409 F. 2d
611 (CAlO 1969), and United States v. Rothbart, 653 F. 2d
462 (CAlO 1981). *
In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, we said with respect to a hearsay declaration where the declarant was unavailable as a trial
witness:
"[H]is statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 448
U.S., at 66.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico was therefore wrong in
thinking that the analysis in Ohio v. Roberts would allow a
hearsay declaration to be admitted into evidence only if there
had been a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
in a judicial proceeding. Although hearsay statements made
by codefendants like the one at issue in the instant case are
generally presumed to be unreliable, under Ohio v. Roberts
the State nevertheless must be provided an opportunity to
*The New Mexico Supreme Court also believed that Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965), was "directly on point" and mandated thereversal of respondent's conviction. N. M. - , - , 703 P. 2d 872,
(1985). To the extent that Douglas v. Alabama interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-examination prior
to the admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no
longer good law. Although Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), did not
attempt to set forth specific standards for constitutional admissibility appliU. S.
cable to all categories of hearsay, see United States v. Inadi, -, (1986), that decision did make it clear that a lack of cross-examination is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under the
Confrontation Clause. See Lee v. Illinois,- U . S . - , - (1986).

85-162-PER CURIAM
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demonstrate that a particular codefendant statement bears
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy Confrontation
Clause concerns. See Lee v. Illinois,-- U.S.--,-(1986). If the codefendant is unavailable and the State
makes a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption of unreliability attaching to the codefendant's extra-judicial statement, then the testimony is constitutionally admissible,
whether or not it was subject to cross-examination in a prior
judicial proceeding.
In Lee v. Illinois, supra, also decided today, we analyze in
greater detail the nature of the inquiry into "indicia of reliability" of a hearsay declaration by a codefendant which incriminates one in the position of respondent in this case. We
therefore vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico and remand the case to that court for reconsideration
in light of our decision in Lee v. Illinois.

It is so ordered .

.. . ""

Jnvrtntt <!l.LtUrt rl t4t ~nittb Jbdt.tr
Jla.&'lfhtgton, ~. <11· 2llp~~
CH"MBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

April 23, 1986

No. 85-162

New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill,
I agree with your revised Per Curiam.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Bill

DATE:

April 24, 1986

RE:

New Mexico v. Earnest, No. 85-162
2nd Draft Per Curiam

Justice Rehnquist has made
the p.c. in this case.

signifi ~ n ~es

~
in

On page 2, the p.c. now explicitly

states that "hearsay statements made by codefendants like
the

one

at

presumed

to

issue
be

under Ohio v.

in

the

instant

un~li__ab.lj ."

Roberts,

case

are

generally

It goes on to state

that,

states must nevertheless be given

the opportunity to rebut that presumption.

This correctly

states the law as it will stand once Lee v. Illinois, No.
84-6807, is handed down.
I

note

also

that

the

one

cite

to

Inadi

in

opinion--see p. 2, n. *--is substantively accurate.

this
I see

no reason not to join the p.c.

(Mike has seen this draft

as

that might conflict with

well,

either

and

he

sees

nothing

Brennan's opinion or

your Court opinion
I recommend you joi •

the dissent in Lee,

or with

April 24, 1986

85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill:
1 agr@e with your Per Curiam.

Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquiat
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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.lqn"tmt OJ&mrt &tf tJrt ~ i\bdt•

·-Jrittllhm. ~. OJ. 21lp'l~

CH .. MBER!! OP'

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 12, 1986

Re:

85-162 - New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill ':
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~lt}tt"tmt <lfnnd

ltf tlft ~b ~hdte

'IJae~ ~.

<lf.

211.;i'l~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 16, 1986

Re:

No. 85-162-New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill:
I

agree with your Per Curiam.
Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

.hprttttt <!j:cnrl of tift ~tti:ttb .ShtUtt
.u!rhtgtcn. ~. <!j:. 2ll.?,.~
June 16, 1986

CHAMBE:RS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 85-162, New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your proposed
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

~curiam.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Jus tic~ Marshall
Justice 'Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor ·
From:

Justice Rehnquist

Circulated:

JUN 1 8 1986

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

85-162

NEW MEXICO, PETITIONER v. RALPH
RODNEY EARNEST
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW MEXICO
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring.
I agree that the decision of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico should be vacated and the case remanded for further
consideration in light of Lee v. Illinois, - - U. S. - (1986). The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the admission against respondent of an out-of-court statement of a
codefendant violated respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court believed that Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965), was
"directly on point" and mandated the reversal of respondent's
conviction because there had been. no opportunity for respondent to cross-examine the codefendant, either at the
time the statement was made or at trial. - - N. M. - - ,
- , 703 P. 2d 872, (1985).
As Lee v. Illinois makes clear, to the extent that Douglas
v. Alabama interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-examination prior to the admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no
longer good law. Although Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56
(1980), did not attempt to set forth specific standards for constitutional admissibility applicable to all categories of hearsay, see United States v. Inadi, - - U . S . - - , - - (1986),
that decision did establish that a lack of cross-examination is
not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under
the Confrontation Clause. See Lee v. Illinois,-- U. S., at

•

85-162-CONCUR
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In the instant case, ther.efore, the State is .entitled to
an opportunity to overcome the general presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy Confrontation Clause
concerns.

June 18 , 1986

85-162 New Mexico v . Earnest

Dear Bill:

Please

~oin

mP in your concurring opinion.
SincP.rel.v ,

JusticP

Rehnqul~t

lfp/ss
cc :

The Conference

____

.._
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tlrt ~tb .i~a.tts
jiJulfing~ ~. cq. 20,?~~

~u.prtmt C!fau:rt af

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

I
June 18, 1986

Re:

No. 85-162

New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Chief, Lewis and Sandra,
I have converted my Per Curiam opinion in the above case,
which you previously joined, into . an opinion concurring in the
order remanding the case to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
I hope
that you will be able to join the opinion in its new form.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Powell
Justice O'Connor

<!fonri of tJtt ~~ iltatt•
'Jfulrht\lhtn. Jl. Of. 20c?'l~

i\lt.prtm:t

CHAMI!IERS 0,..

June 18, 1986

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

RE:

~-

85-162 - New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill:
I join your concurring opining dated today.

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

·,

'

'

.invrtntt <!Jourt af t4t ~Utlt Jtatt.tr
Jla$lfhtgton, ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 19, 1986

Re:

85-162

New Mexico v. Earnest

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest (Bill)
WHR for the Court 4/7/86
1st draft PC 4/17/86
2nd draft 4/23/86
Joined by CJ 4/21/86
soc 4/23/86
LFP 4/24/86
JPS 6/12/86
WJB PC - first draft 6/3/87
Joined by HAB 6/16/86
TM 6/16/86
WHR concurring
1st draft 6/18/86
2nd draft 6/19/86
Joined by LFP 6/18/86
CJ 6/18/86
soc 6/19/86

